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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
  
                
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Aamco Transmissions, Inc., appeals from an order 
entered on September 20, 1994, granting the appellee Granite 
State Insurance Company judgment on the pleadings on both 
Granite's complaint and Aamco's counterclaim in this diversity of 
citizenship insurance coverage declaratory judgment action.  The 
parties have briefed this case under Pennsylvania law and thus we 
will decide this case the way we believe the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania would decide it.  As might be expected from the 
procedural posture of the case, the facts are not in dispute. 
 
 I. 
 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 This case arose out of a class action commenced in 
October 1990 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 
by Joseph R. Tracy and Joseph P. Tracy against Aamco.  The Tracys 
asserted that Aamco operated a nationwide network of automobile 
transmission repair shops at about 800 franchised outlets.  They 
claimed to have purchased "Lifetime Rebuilt Transmission 
Services" from Aamco franchisees.  According to the Tracys, Aamco 
used deceptive advertising which did not describe its services 
accurately and which lured purchasers of transmission services 
into paying more than they should have paid and induced them to 
pay for unnecessary repairs.   
  
 The Tracys brought the action, with exclusions not 
material here, on behalf of themselves and all Pennsylvania 
residents who had purchased reconditioned, rebuilt or reassembled 
automatic transmission services from Pennsylvania Aamco 
franchisees during the six years before they started their 
action.1  The Tracys asserted that Aamco was liable under the 
Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 201-3 (1993), which provides a remedy 
for various unfair methods of competition and trade practices. 
 At the time the Tracys brought their action and during 
the six previous years, Granite insured Aamco under a 
comprehensive general liability insurance policy for "personal 
injury or advertising injury . . . arising out of the conduct of" 
Aamco's business.  The policy defined "advertising injury" as an 
"injury arising . . . in the course of [Aamco's] advertising 
activities, if such injury arises out of libel, slander, 
defamation, violation of right of privacy, piracy, unfair 
competition, or infringement of copyright, title or slogan."  
Relying on the policy, Aamco demanded that Granite defend and 
indemnify it in the Tracy case, claiming that it had coverage 
under the "unfair competition" category of the "advertising 
injury" coverage.  Granite, however, declined to cover Aamco, and 
                     
1
.  Morgan Industries, Inc., which is or was the parent of Aamco, 
was also a defendant in the Tracy action and is a defendant in 
this case but as it is not an appellant we make no further 
reference to it.  We have not described the Tracys' allegations 
in detail because for our purposes that case is relevant only for 
the fact that it was brought by purchasers of Aamco's services 
rather than by a competitor of Aamco. 
  
Aamco then settled the Tracy action itself.  Granite subsequently 
brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that it was 
not obligated to provide coverage to Aamco for the claims in the 
Tracy action.  Aamco counterclaimed for its expenses in defending 
and settling the Tracy case. 
 Subsequently Granite made a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings which the district court granted in a memorandum 
opinion.  At the outset the court set forth familiar general 
principles of insurance law.  It explained that under 
Pennsylvania law when the facts are not in dispute the court 
interprets an insurance policy as a matter of law.  See Pacific 
Indem. Co. v. Linn, 766 F.2d 754, 760 (3d Cir. 1985).  It then 
indicated that it would review the terms of the Granite policy to 
determine the parties' intent and in doing so would read the 
policy as a whole and construe it according to its plain meaning.  
See Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brotech Corp., 857 F. Supp. 423, 
427 (E.D. Pa. 1994), aff'd, No. 94-1897,      F.3d      (3d Cir. 
May 12, 1995) (table).  The court said that if the policy 
language is clear it must be given effect according to its plain 
meaning but if the language is ambiguous all doubts as to its 
meaning should be resolved in favor of the insured.  See St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 935 F.2d 1428, 1430 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
 The court then addressed the particular issue at hand.  
It noted that inasmuch as the policy did not define "unfair 
competition," it would construe that term "in the context of 
insurance coverage according to case law," resolving all 
  
ambiguities in Aamco's favor.  Although Aamco argued that the 
policy covered claims for all violations of Pennsylvania's 
business fraud statute, the court followed Atlantic Mutual and 
held that the term "unfair competition" in the Granite policy 
"does not include claims based on state or federal statute."  See 
Atlantic Mutual, 857 F. Supp. at 428.  Thus, as the Tracys 
predicated their claims solely on the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection Law, the court held that 
Granite's policy did not cover the claims.  The court further 
held that the term "unfair competition" was not ambiguous and 
that Aamco could not have had a reasonable expectation that the 
Tracys' claims were covered.  In view of those conclusions the 
court did not address Granite's alternative contention that the 
policy confines coverage for an advertising injury to claims by 
the insured's business competitors and does not cover claims by 
its customers.  Aamco then appealed.  We have jurisdiction under 




 We will affirm, though we do not ground our result on 
the district court's reasoning as we do not agree with its 
conclusion that the phrase "unfair competition" unambiguously 
refers only to the traditional common law tort of that name.2  
                     
2
.  We exercise plenary review.  See Electric Ins. Co. v. Rubin, 
32 F.3d 814, 815 (3d Cir. 1994). 
  
For one thing, the courts are not uniform in describing the tort 
of unfair competition.  "The tort developed as an equitable 
remedy against the wrongful exploitation of trade names and 
common law trademarks that were not otherwise entitled to legal 
protection."  Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 
551 (Cal. 1992).  See also AT & T v. Winback and Conserve 
Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1428 & n.9 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(describing cause of action for unfair competition under Lanham 
Act), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1838 (1995).  Thus, in Bank of the 
West the court indicated that "[t]he common law tort of unfair 
competition is generally thought to be synonymous with the act of 
'passing off' one's goods as those of another."  Nevertheless the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that other types of 
conduct can constitute unfair competition actionable at common 
law.  See Carl A. Colteryahn Dairy, Inc. v. Schneider Dairy, 203 
A.2d 469, 473 (Pa. 1964) (finding it illegal to make false or 
misleading statements about the circumstances under which an 
employee left an employer).  Therefore, it is not so easy to 
conclude that there is one narrow and clear category of the 
common law tort. 
 Furthermore, regardless of the scope of the common law 
tort of unfair competition, a person reading the term "unfair 
competition" as a category of "advertising injury" within an 
insurance policy would not necessarily understand the term to be 
limited to a common law definition.  A broader interpretation of 
the term than in Bank of the West would be particularly 
reasonable in Pennsylvania as that state's legislature has 
  
defined "[u]nfair methods of competition" to include a host of 
activities in addition to passing off goods or services as those 
of another.  Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 201-2(4) (1993).  In 
short, we see no valid reason to exclude conduct described in the 
statute simply because it might not be regarded as unfair 
competition in a common law sense. 
 Yet even if the term "unfair competition" within an 
insurance policy is construed broadly with respect to the 
character of an insured's conduct, that construction does not 
determine the class of persons who can present claims against the 
insured which will be regarded as being claims for unfair 
competition within the policy.  Thus, in order for Aamco to 
succeed, it must show that claims by its customers injured by its 
own practices reasonably can be described as unfair competition 
claims within the context of the insurance coverage.  In this 
endeavor it fails for, regardless of the nature of the insured's 
conduct, a claim by a consumer of its products or services 
arising from that conduct hardly can be characterized as a claim 
for unfair competition.  After all, "competition" connotes an 
insured's relationship with other persons or entities supplying 
similar goods or services.   
 In fact, the Pennsylvania legislature itself recognized 
this point.  The statute involved in the Tracy action is not 
called the "Pennsylvania Unfair Competition Statute."  Rather, it 
is the "Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer 
Protection Law." (Emphasis added).  It is a broad business fraud 
statute that by its very title demonstrates that it encompasses 
  
more than acts of unfair competition.  Indeed, the statute 
distinguishes explicitly between "unfair methods of competition" 
and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices," though it lists them 
together in one subsection.  Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, § 201-2(4) 
(1993).  The fact that the legislature deemed it expedient to 
combine the remedies for unfair competition and consumer fraud in 
one statute does not magically transform acts of "consumer fraud" 
into acts of "unfair competition."  Accordingly, we think that 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would hold that a competitor of 
the insured, but not its customer, can assert a claim which may 
be covered under the "unfair competition" category of the 
"advertising injury" coverage.3  While we acknowledge, as did the 
district court, that ambiguities in insurance policies should be 
resolved in an insured's favor, the Granite policy is not 
ambiguous with respect to the relationship required between a 
plaintiff in an underlying action and an insured for that 
plaintiff's claim to be considered unfair competition within the 
Granite policy. 
 The result we reach is consistent with the overall 
definition of "advertising injury" in the policy.  As we have 
                     
3
.  Under the statute, "[a] private cause of action . . . is 
available only to consumers who have purchased goods or services 
for personal, family, or household purposes."  Merv Swing Agency, 
Inc. v. Graham Co., 579 F. Supp. 429, 430 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (citing 
statute).  However, the statute protects business competitors 
from unfair competition, as it authorizes the Attorney General 
and district attorneys to bring actions in the name of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania against people they have reason to 
belive are "using or about to use any method, act, or practice 
declared by . . . this act to be unlawful."  Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 
73, § 201-4 (1993). 
  
indicated, the Granite policy defines "advertising injury" to 
include injuries arising from "libel, slander, defamation, 
violation of right of privacy, piracy . . . or infringement of 
copyright, title or slogan" as well as unfair competition.  While 
we do not say that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would 
conclude that none of these categories could provide coverage for 
a claim by a customer against an insured vendor, as we have no 
reason to reach that point, none of the categories suggests 
claims which a customer is likely to assert against a vendor.  
Rather, the categories all define claims which an insured's 
competitor might assert against it.  For example, a competitor 
might base a libel action on an insured's negative advertising.  
Thus, the definition of "advertising injury" lends support to our 
conclusion that the word "competition" as used in "unfair 
competition" limits coverage to claims by competitors of the 
insured.   
 We also point out that if "unfair competition" includes 
coverage for a claim by a customer against an insured, the 
insured "would simply shift the loss to [its] insurer and, in 
effect, retain the proceeds of [its] unlawful conduct."  Bank of 
the West, 833 F.2d at 553.  In this case a finding of coverage 
would mean that Granite would be obliged to reimburse Aamco for 
the costs to defend and settle the Tracy case but that Aamco 
could retain whatever funds it received by reason of the Tracy 
  
plaintiffs having obtained transmission services from Aamco 
franchisees.4  Our outcome avoids this untoward result.     
 While the parties have not brought to our attention any 
opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or Superior Court 
addressing the issue before us, opinions from other courts are 
consistent with our result.  Thus, in Ruder & Finn, Inc. v. 
Seaboard Sur. Co., 422 N.E.2d 518, 522 (N.Y. 1981) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), the court accepted the insurer's 
argument that "the primary concern in unfair competition is the 
protection of a business from another's misappropriation of the 
business' organization or its expenditure of labor, skill and 
money."  In Boggs v. Whitaker, Lipp & Helea, Inc., 784 P.2d 1273, 
1275 (Wash. Ct. App.), review denied, 791 P.2d 535 (Wash. 1990),   
the court held that the term "unfair competition" in a policy 
including coverage for advertising offenses did not apply to a 
claim under the Washington Consumer Protection Act as "unfair 
competition" referred "only to acts against competitors."  In 
Practice Management Assocs. v. Old Dominion Ins. Co., 601 So.2d 
587 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 613 So.2d 8 (Fla. 
1992), the appellate court approved a trial court's opinion that 
the term "unfair competition" within the definition of 
advertising injury "refers unambiguously only to actions 
affecting competitors."5 
                     
4
.  We recognize that there was no finding of wrongdoing in the 
Tracy action. 
5
.  Aamco in its brief recites that in O'Brien v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 293 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1961), we held that "claims of 
unfair competition do not relate exclusively to claims between 
  
 Moreover, we recently held, in interpreting section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), the federal unfair 
competition statute, that "Congress . . . did not contemplate 
that federal courts should entertain claims brought by 
consumers."  Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1179 
(3d Cir. 1993).  Rather, the Lanham Act "is primarily intended to 
protect commercial interests and . . . section 43(a) of the 
statute provides a private remedy to a commercial plaintiff who 
meets the burden of proving that its commercial interests have 
been harmed by a competitor's false advertising."  Id. at 1177 
(citing Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 
902 F.2d 222, 230 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal alterations omitted) 
(emphasis added)).  We find Serbin's reasoning particularly 
persuasive because "the Lanham Act is derived generally and 
purposefully from the common law tort of unfair competition, and 
its language parallels the protections afforded by state common 
law and statutory torts" of that nature.  AT&T v. Winback, 42 
F.3d at 1433. 
 We have not overlooked Aamco's argument "that the 
proper focus regarding issues of coverage under insurance 
contracts is the reasonable expectation of the insured," as set 
(..continued) 
competitors and found that unfair competition could be 
successfully claimed between an employee and his employer."  
Brief at 22 n.2.  But O'Brien is completely different from this 
case as it did not involve a claim by a purchaser against a 
vendor.  Furthermore, we largely predicated our result on our 
observation "that all persons are free to enter the trade at any 
time and are therefore potential competitors."  Id. at 13-14.  
Therefore, O'Brien does not support Aamco's claim for coverage.   
  
forth in St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Corbett, 630 A.2d 28, 30 
(Pa. Super. Ct.), dismissed without op., 634 A.2d 221 (Pa. 1993).  
Rather, we conclude that Aamco could not have expected to have 
insurance coverage for the Tracys' claims under the portion of a 
policy protecting it against claims of "unfair competition."  As 
we explained above, it would be expected that a claim arising 
from "competition" would be forwarded by a competitor of an 
insured.  The Tracys and the class they represented were not 




 For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the order of 
September 20, 1994. 
                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
